Introduction
The cases which form the subject of this review brought into focus the interface and tension between two major developments in criminal justice over the last two decades: the trend towards longer than normal sentencing for 'dangerous' offenders and the rise of accredited offending behaviour programmes.
Successive governments in the United Kingdom have legislated for more severe punishment for certain categories of offenders. The Criminal Justice Act 1991 introduced longer than commensurate sentences and revised extended sentences for violent and sexual offenders. The Crimes Sentences Act 1997 brought in automatic life sentences for a second serious offence. More recently, sentencing legislation was overhauled in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (the ' Act'), which represented a further shift towards public protection as the primary rationale in sentencing serious offenders 2 . One consequence of this shift has been the increasing availability of, and requirement for, indeterminate sentences 3 . The general approach of the Act is to introduce a new framework whereby offenders convicted of at least moderately severe violent or sexual offences must be assessed for 'dangerousness' and if found to be a significant risk of causing serious harm must receive heavier sentences for the purpose of public protection. The Act introduced a statutory assessment of dangerousness containing a 'statutory assumption of dangerous', meaning that an adult offender found guilty of a second or subsequent 'specified' violent or sexual offence is assumed to be dangerous unless that assumption can be rebutted under s229(3). Specified offences are listed in Schedule 15 of the Act, but are simply all violent or sexual offences carrying a maximum sentence of two or more years' imprisonment. Violent and sexual offences carrying a maximum sentence of ten or more years' imprisonment are further identified as 'serious offences'. The Act created new sentences for those identified as dangerous, including 'imprisonment for public protection' ('IPP') -an indeterminate sentence for offenders convicted of a serious offence, but not meeting the requirements of imprisonment for life 4 . In the first two years after the Act came into force, more than 2,200 IPPs were handed down 5 and the number of 'lifers' detained on the prison estate rose by nearly 10% 6 . Official estimates suggest over 10,000 prisoners will be detained in custody under an IPP by 2014 7 and they have been identified as a cause of prison overcrowding 8 .
Historically, indeterminate sentences were largely reserved for offenders in whom a degree of 'mental instability' had been demonstrated as per R v Hodgson (1967) 52 Cr App R 113 9 . In R v Wilkinson (1983) 5 Cr App R (s) 60, Lord Lane went so far as to state that discretionary life sentences were reserved, broadly speaking, for those who could not be dealt with under mental health legislation, yet were in a mental state which made them dangerous 10 .
Therefore, it can be seen that under previous regimes, indeterminate sentences were given to offenders exhibiting some degree of mental abnormality in a broader sense. Presumably, the new indeterminate sentences introduced by the Act, including the IPP, 'capture' a similar group of mentally abnormal offenders, as well as other serious offenders who are likely to have deficits in a range of domains including interpersonal behaviour, social skills, pro-social problem-solving and consequential thinking in addition to having histories of substance misuse.
The notion that one cause of offending is deficits in cognitive skills which can be made good (or least diminished) through cognitive-behavioural therapeutic approaches, and in turn reduce recidivism, forms the theoretical underpinning of cognitive skills programmes that have been introduced to UK prisons. In the 1970s there was considerable pessimism about the effectiveness of rehabilitation interventions aimed at reducing re-offending, encapsulated in the widely-held view that 'nothing works' 11 . From the mid1980s, a body of research assembled which asserted that offending behaviour groupwork could produce a At Mr James's judicial review, Collins J applied the decision in Walker and held detention beyond tariff to be unlawful. In this case the stakes were higher as James, unlike Walker, was already post-tariff. Collins J decided that although it was, "potentially disastrous" 20 his immediate release must be ordered. Mindful, not unlikely, of the immense consequences of this decision to the population of post-tariff life prisoners, the judge stayed his decision to give the Secretary of State the opportunity to appeal.
The Decision
The appeal was allowed in part. On the decision to order James's immediate release, the Court of Appeal, presided over by Lord Chief Justice Phillips, ruled that the finding that the detention of life prisoners beyond their tariff in such circumstances was unlawful, was itself erroneous. Primarily, the Court accepted the 2003 Act had made express statutory provision for the circumstances in which IPP prisoners may be released:
"Central to this is the requirement that the Parole Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. It is not possible to describe a prisoner who remains in accordance with these provisions as 'unlawfully detained' under common law. The common law must give way to the express requirements of the statute" 21
The Secretary of State's success was limited to this (albeit important) aspect of the cases.
The Secretary of State's submission that he was not under any relevant duty to provide treatment or training in prison was found to be "lacking in realism" 22 . His counsel asserted that there was no basis for saying it was an underlying premise of the Act that he would provide IPP prisoners with the maximum opportunity to demonstrate to the Parole Board that it was no longer necessary to detain them for the protection of the public 23 . Furthermore, the appellant claimed it was for the independent Parole Board to decide what evidence satisfied it that an IPP prisoner should be released and any fettering of its discretion (such as by making release dependent on the completion of courses) would itself be unlawful 24 .
In rejecting this submission, the Court of Appeal decided that the performance of the appropriate courses is likely to be a prerequisite to a prisoner satisfying the Parole Board because experience had shown that 
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The Secretary of State for Justice has a duty to provide Offending Behaviour Programmes in prison -submissions to the contrary are lacking in realism! such courses are usually necessary if dangerous offenders are to cease to be dangerous, and highlighted the significance of such evidence in current practice. The Court noted the Secretary of State had chosen to bring the Act into force and yet had not provided the resources to give effect to his own policy of offering these courses 25 . It concluded that this conduct breached his public law duty because its direct and natural consequence was the detention of some prisoners beyond the time necessary either for punishment or for the protection of the public, contrary to the intention of Parliament (and the object of Article 5 of which Parliament must have been mindful).
The Court turned lastly to claims made on behalf of the prisoners that their treatment constituted infringement of certain of their rights under article 5(1) and 5(4) of the European Convention of Human Rights 26 . The Court reviewed the Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence on indefinite detention. In lengthy considerations it agreed that the legality of the post-tariff period of an indeterminate sentence imposed for the public protection is dependent on the prisoner remaining a threat to the public and reasoned:
"Article 5(4) requires this legality to be subject to periodic review by a body with the qualities of a court. If, in the period between two such reviews a prisoner ceases to be dangerous, this will not mean that his detention in the remainder of that period infringes Article 5(1). That article must be read in conjunction with Article 5(4) so as to produce a practical result. If, however, a review is unreasonably delayed and it is shown that, by reason of the delay, the prisoner has been detained after the time that he should have been released, that period of detention will constitute an infringement of Article 5(1)." 27
Applying these tests to the cases before them, the Court considered whether the Parole Board could review detention as required by Article 5(4) when offenders had not completed treatment courses. They concluded that whilst this state of affairs would not formally prevent a case being heard, the review would be an empty exercise and the outcome a foregone conclusion. For each claimant it found that if the situation continued it would be likely to result in a breach of Art 5(4). However, their Lordships did not apparently feel the delays were yet long enough for that breach to have taken place.
There remained the question as to whether in the absence of periodic review the offenders were no longer being detained for the object for which the IPPs were imposed, which would mean their detention could not be justified under Article 5(1)(a). The Court accepted that if so long a time elapsed without a meaningful review, detention would become disproportionate or arbitrary. However, without further explanatory comments they decided that this stage had not been reached, and emphasised that failure to comply would not in itself result in infringement of Article 5(1)(a). Nevertheless, the decision explicitly left open the possibility that this article could be so infringed in the future.
Comment
The Secretary of State's partial success has avoided the "potentially disastrous" prospect (identified by Collins J. at first instance) of indeterminately detained dangerous offenders being released without demonstrating they no longer represented a significant risk of serious harm to the public. However, the conduct of the Secretary of State has been strongly criticised and held to be in breach of his public law 28 . They found that only 32% of oral hearings for indeterminate sentences were being held on time.
One of the two most common reasons for deferrals was the Board not receiving the information required to make a decision. In particular, 97 of 276 indeterminate cases did not contain either an Offender Assessment System report (which would draw heavily on reports from offending behaviour courses) or a life sentence plan. In these circumstances it is not difficult to envisage how a lengthy delay might occur.
In the longer term, the problem of offending behaviour programme provision and other problems arising from having a large population of prisoners detained indeterminately with short tariffs may be ameliorated to some extent by provisions of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007, which is currently before Parliament. Part of this wide-ranging bill seeks to amend the dangerous offender provisions of the Act. Most significantly, in a notable volte-face by the Government, it intends to remove the statutory assumption of dangerousness and also allow courts discretion in sentencing offenders who meet all the criteria for IPP and extended sentences. There would still remain ample opportunity to impose indeterminate sentences, but such amendments would probably reduce the numbers of those detained indeterminately whose short tariff perhaps hints at the courts' misgivings in handing down this type of sentence in the first place.
In conclusion, this judgement confirms the right of indeterminately detained prisoners to access appropriate offending behaviour programmes in a timely fashion. It affirms the regard in which cognitively-oriented psychological and educational interventions are now held and the importance placed on such work by criminal justice system. In the long view, all this seems far removed from the period less than three decades ago when little in the way of psychological rehabilitation was viewed as of any great proven worth. Debate may continue as to whether the statistically significant effects of these courses equate to a significant reduction in recidivism or to value for money, but it looks as though they will be offered ever more widely.
The relationship between mental disorder and crime is complex, controversial and well beyond the scope of this article. We can say that offending behaviour courses in their current form attempt to bring about changes in cognition (such as comparative thinking and paranoia) and behaviour (such as substance misuse and emotionally dysregulated violence) which in some individuals will form part of a syndrome of mental illness or other mental disorder. Indeed some courses, in particular substance misuse courses, might be said to treat or prevent classifiable mental disorders specifically. We do know that the prison population as whole contains extremely high rates of mental disorder representing considerable unmet need 29 . Thus, a significant proportion of those in line to participate in offending behaviour programmes in prison will suffer from a mental disorder. The gold standard for treatment for severe mental disorder may be transfer to hospital, but the majority of mentally disordered offenders are detained in prison. It is of interest when evaluating the status of prison-based programmes to reflect that psycho-educational interventions offered in secure hospitals bear many similarities to prison courses and in some institutions some of the very same courses are offered. In conclusion, it can be seen that many of the prisoners to whom this judgment applies will have mental disorders, and in confirming the duty to provide cognitivebehavioural interventions in prison, the Court of Appeal ought to have improved the likelihood of certain mental health treatment needs being met.
